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COURT vs. CONSTITUTION: DISPARATE DISTOR-




Dualism in the American scheme of constitutional lhnitation is one
of its distinguishing characteristics. It was the consequence of conver-
gence, in the great minds that fashioned the constitutions of the new
nation, of two lines of political theory and practice, each of ancient line-
age. One line looks for limitation to the manner in which government
is structured; the other manifests itself in explicitly stated prohibitions
on the exercise of governmental power.
The long evolution of the concept of separation of powers has
been well chronicled.1 Suffice it to observe that the 'Framers were,
under the spell of Montesquieu, thoroughly convinced that functional
fractionalization of governmental powers was essential to maintenance
of limited government. The principle of federalism has roots fully as
deep in antiquity,2 and colonial experience with the intrusions of a uni-
tary mother country made divided government seem a sine qua non
of constitutional limitation.
James Madison realized the kinship of these principles of federal-
ism and separation of powers. Familiar is the passage in The Federal-
ist in which he observed that
[i]n a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will
be controlled by itself.3
t Cary C. Boshamer University Distinguished Professor, The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, The Ohio State
University.
1. Friedrich, Separation of Powers, 13 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 663-66 (1934).
2. Elazar, Federalism, 5 INT'L ENCYc. Soc. Sci. 353, 361-65 (1968); cf. note 4
infra.
3. Tim FEDERALiT No. 51, at 161 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Madison).
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Time has only confirmed Madison's insight.4 The manner in which
"security arises" from these power distributions has never been more
vividly explained than by Justice Louis Brandeis in his celebrated dis-
sent in Myers v. United States.5 Referring to the doctrine of separation
of powers he stressed that its incorporation into the basic structure of
the Constitution of 1787 was "not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy."
Subsequently Justice Brandeis authored the opinion in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 7 destined to be for over thirty years the last Su-
preme Court pronouncement suggesting federalistic limitation on the
powers of Congress. Although Erie contains for federalism no such ex-
press explanation as that in Myers, Mr. Justice Harlan was later to re-
gard it as a similar assertion of the function of federally divided govern-
ment.
I have always regarded that decision as one of the modem corner-
stones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch
the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal sys-
tems. Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting sys-
tems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens. . . . And
it recognized that the scheme of our Constitution envisions an allo-
cation of law-making functions between state and federal legisla-
tive processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make
substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of con-
gressional legislative powers in this regard.8
4. Roche, Distribution of Powers, 3 INT'L ENCYC. SOC. Scr. 300 (1968), treats
Madison's "insight" as pragmatic rather than conceptual so far as federalism is con-
cerned. To him Madison along with Jefferson was no friend of federalism at the time
of the Convention; their embrasure of divided government sprang from a realization that
a unitary form of structure would never be accepted. The author asserts that federal-
ism did not have the conceptual acceptance enjoyed by the theory of separation of
powers. Contra, Elazar, supra note 2.
5. 272 U.S. 52, 240 (1926).
6. Id. at 293.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Writing more generally without reference to Erie, Justice Frankfurter had, in a case in-
volving the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, invoked "the presupposi-
tions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not
as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy ... ." San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). Quite recently, Justice
Rehnquist in a preemption case drew upon this articulation of the significance of federal-
ism. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
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Both federalism and separation of powers achieve protection of the in-
dividual from Government Unlimited as a by-product of the friction in-
duced by articulated power allocations in the structure of government.
By reason of this indirect mode of protective operation, federalism and
separated powers can be visualized as devices for indirect limitation.
Long in evolution was a distinctly different political theory, boldly'
holding that crasser acts of government are legally out of bounds. Be-
cause this concept directly challenges the claims of Government Unlim-
ited, rather than seeking to reduce its thrust through calculated diffu-
sion of total power, the theory suggests itself as one of direct limitation.
A leading Biblical scholar convincingly writes that origins of this theory
can be found in the political practices of the Hebrews during their peri-
ods of monarchy." Other scholars are convinced that the writings of
Cicero reveal the concept in gestation. The theory became embryon-
ically operational with chapter 39 of Magna Carta. Runnymede is one
of the great occasions of history; after 1215 the monarchs of England
might continue their acts of despotism but thenceforth those actions
were in violation of the fundamental law of the realm. If at first the
restrictions of chapter 39 pertained only to procedures, limitations of
a substantive nature as well were to find their place there. Certainly
this was true by Coke's time, to which he contributed strength and
scope as a Judge of Common Pleas and later as a Member of Parlia-
ment. 10 It is familiar learning that at the end of the momentous seven-
teenth century, England reversed its field to embrace the theoretical
omnipotence of Parliament, but that the Englishmen of the New World
found the evolving theory of direct limitation a congenial concept in
their struggle for freedom."
When the time came to draft the fundamental law of states and
nation, both the political theory of indirect limitation-separation of
powers and federalism-and that of direct limitation-procedural and
substantive-were fully accepted political dogma.'2 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, both were from the first incorporated into American written
constitutions. In retrospect, adoption of dualism in constitutional limi-
tation may have been a mistake. As able and dispassionate a constitu-
tional scholar as Charles McIlwain was of this opinion, further urging
9. E. TRuEBLOOD, THE PREDICAMENT oF MODERN MAN 78-79 (1944).
10. F. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSITrUTIONAL LAw 43-48 (1950).
11. One able historian writes of this as "the American consensus." C. RossrrER,
Tnr POLmCAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERIcAN REvoLtToN 52-63 (1963).
12. The evolution and flowering of each are traced in F. STRONG, supra note 10,
at 27-68.
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that the indirect form of limitation, at least separation of powers, should
have been scuttled in favor of the direct.13 To the contrary, Judge
Learned Hand, viewing the matter from the standpoint of judicial de-
termination of constitutionality, expressed himself as favoring relega-
tion of the judicial role to the umpiring of disputes over allocation of
powers among the different divisions of government; in a word, it was
only with respect to indirect limitations that courts should exercise
power to pass on constitutionality. 4
Incorporation of dual political theories of limitation into American
constitutions did not carry with it the solution to the problem of effec-
tive implementation. The innovative period of design of the original
state constitutions remains fascinating for the several devices conceived
for that purpose. In several of The Federalist Papers James Madison
examined those devices, only to find none to his satisfaction.' 5 One
approach inevitably open was that of departmental self-control; let leg-
islature, executive, and judiciary each police responsibly the limits of
its own province. "If men were angels" this would solve the problem,
but the flaw lay in the absence of any mechanism for deterring inevita-
ble encroachments of one branch upon another. Reputedly the weak-
est of the three segments of government, the judicial branch, even after
Montesquieu had won for it a theoretical equality with legislature and
executive, was not long in experiencing inroads upon it by the other
two branches.
It was largely in this context that state courts and later the United
States Supreme Court began to claim not only authority to perform the
function of a coordinate branch in the interpretation and administration
of law, but as well to appropriate the extraordinary power to function
as the umpire of the Constitution's dual limitations. The clearest pre-
cedent for constitutional review prior to the Federal Convention was
the North Carolina case of Bayard v. Singleton,'0 in which the new
power was exercised defensively to protect the jurisdiction of the judi-
cial division created by the North Carolina constitution. In functional
effect, Marbury v. Madison17 was the same: deterrence of the Con-
13. C. McIkwAIN, CONSTrntmoNALisM AND Tm CHANGING WORM 244-46 (1939).
14. L. HAND, THm Spntrr OF LinuRrry 155 (3d ed. 1960). Judge Hand's opposition
was basically to constitutional review of direct substantive limitations. He may well
have thought direct procedural limitations to be related to indirect limitations, as func-
tionally they are.
15. Tim FEDERALISi Nos. 48-50, at 146-58 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Madison).
16. 1 N.C. 5 (1787).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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gress from allegedly extending the Court's original jurisdiction beyond
the constitutional limitation as Marshall construed article f]I. 8
Concededly, Marshall used language in Marbury as a trial balloon
to test the political climate respecting broader exercise of constitutional
review. His only effective challenge came in 1825 from Justice Gibson
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 9 who, twenty years later, threw
in the towel in a triumph of paralogism over reasoned analysis. Rather
paradoxically, the most threatening challenge to nondefensive constitu-
tional review that occurred during this period was to Supreme Court
review of state court decisions, a type of constitutional review Justice
Gibson readily accepted in light of his perception of constitutional
structure and of the crucial decision in Martin v. Hunrers Lessee.20
It required nearly all of the nineteenth century for firm establishment
of constitutional review, both vertically and horizontally, with respect
to the full panoply of constitutional limitations, direct as well as indi-
rect, on all branches of government.
Whatever the merits of dual limitations in American constitutions,
or of eventual full embrace of the concept of courts as the exclusive
interpreters of those constitutionalized theories of limitation, there can
be no question but that the consequence is complexity compounded.
And complexity easily produces possibilities of misinterpretation. The
same judicial bodies are performing two quite divergent functions,
those of judicial review and of constitutional review. A classic instance
of confusion resulting from this is the recent Three Sisters' Bridge liti-
gation.2 No wonder that several of the nations that have adapted from
this country the practice of constitutional review have established sepa-
rate courts for the purpose.
Aside from litigation under the contract clause, until past the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century constitutional review of indirect limita-
tions was more common than that of direct limitations. The decades
after the Civil War witnessed the great rise of due process as a direct
limitation on governmental regulation of economic affairs; and, with its
demise in this century, that limitation has been replaced by the emer-
18. The frailties in the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall are well exposed in
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ. 1.
19. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 330, 343-55 (1825).
20. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
21. Volpe v. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972). This recent litigation has been used as a
vehicle for explaining the difference between judicial review and constitutional review.
See Strong, Three Little Words and What They Didn't Seem to Mean, 59 A.B.A.J. 29
(1973).
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gence of the first amendment, due process, and equal protection as bul-
warks of civil liberties. With the emphasis so shifted to direct limita-
tions as those fully protective of the individual, appreciation of the fact
that indirect limitations are designed for the very same objective has
dulled. In place of their historic function in political theory, there is
a growing view of them as protective of the various governmental units
that are the intended product of diffusion of authority through division
or separation of governmental power.
22
Two decisions of Chief Justice Warren in his last years illustrate
his difficulties with the purpose of indirect limitations. In South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach2 he correctly rejected the claim of South Carolina
(and of some of the other states as amici curiae) for protection under
that facet of the separation doctrine specifically enunciated in the bill
of attainder clauses and more generally derived from the structural sep-
aration of the judicial from the legislative function. "[C]ourts have
consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I and the
principle of the separation of powers only as protections for individual
persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-
judicial determinations of guilt."24
Yet in Flast v. Cohen,25 two years later, he assumed a distinction
in objective between direct and indirect constitutional limitations, disre-
garding the latter's function as affording protection of the individual
against governmental intrusion upon guaranteed private right. Apply-
22. For separation of powers there is a refreshing return to the historic function
of indirect limitation in recent commentary of Anthony Lewis. "In the deepest sense
the safety of liberty in this country rests on respect for the separation of powers--on
Congress as a balance to the growth of Presidential power." Lewis, Only Congress It-
self, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1975, at 41, col. 1. Mr. Lewis states that anyone in need
of recollecting this truth should read The Morality of Consent, the last writing of the
late Alexander Bickel, recently published posthumously by the Yale University Press.
There is not wanting some continuing recognition of the original conception of federal-
ism's function, Boehm, Federalism, 6 ENcyc. Soc. Sm. 169 (1931), and of the value
of that function today. Address by K. Brewster, Jr. (President of Yale University),
American Bar Foundation Annual Dinner, Feb. 22, 1975, in T-m REPORT OF THE PaRsi-
DENT, YAE UNvVERsriY 1974:75; A. VANDERRiLT, Tim Docrmn OF THm SEPARATION
oF Pownns AND Its PRESENT-DAY SicNmcANcE 66 (1963 ed.). Yet traditional federal-
ism is not enjoying "revival" similar to that of separation of powers. Explanation ap-
pears to lie in the specious reasoning that there is no call for limitation on congressional
power vis a vis the states because the states are all represented in the Congress. Many
interests that would be protected by enforcement of a line between federal and state au-
thority have no effective representation in Congress. It is regrettable that Professor
Wechsler has lent his scholarly reputation to this superficiality. See H. WECHSLER,
PpiNCIPLES, PoLncs AND FUNDAE NTAL LAw 80-81 (1961).
23. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
24. Id. at 324.
25. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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iug his two-nexus test, the Chief Justice found that Mrs. ]Frothingham,
taxpayer-plaintiff in the precedent under reexamination in Flast, satis-
fied the first but failed the second.
[S]he lacked standing because her constitutional attack was not
based on an allegation that Congress, in enacting the Maternity Act
of 1921, had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and
spending power. The taxpayer in Frothingham alleged essentially
that Congress, by enacting the challenged statute, had exceeded the
general powers delegated to it by Art. I, § 8, and that Congress had
thereby invaded the legislative province reserved to the States by
the Tenth Amendment. . .. In essence, Mrs. Frothingham was
attempting to assert the States' interest in their legislative preroga-
tives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in being free of taxing
and spending in contravention of specific constitutional limitations
imposed upon Congress' taxing and spending power [such as the
establishment clause of the first amendment].
'26
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Harlan exposed the fallacy of attempting to
restrict standing to direct limitations.
27
The Court's position is equally precarious if it is assumed that its
premise is that the Establishment Clause is in some uncertain fash-
ion a more "specific" limitation upon Congress' powers than are
the various other constitutional commands. . . The specificity
to which the Court repeatedly refers must therefore arise, not from
the provisions' language, but from something implicit in their pur-
poses. But this Court has often emphasized that Congress' powers
to spend are coterminous with the purposes for which, and methods
by which, it may act, and that the various constitutional commands
applicable to the central government, including those implicit both
in the Tenth Amendment and in the General Welfare Clause, thus
operate as limitations upon spending.
28
The best that can be said for Chief Justice Warren is that in Flast he
was lured into conceptual error in an effort to free the Court from the
horns of a dilemma in the matter of standing for constitutional chal-
lenge. Frothingham v. Mellon29 had to be relaxed, yet not to the point
of swamping federal court dockets. But the problem of judicial over-
load must be faced head on, as by some form of provision for a National
26. Id. at 105, discussing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
27. That the Warren test also operated to deny standing to challenge under due
process alleged taking of property, analytically involving a direct limitation, does not mit-
igate the fact that the primary thrust of his test disregarded the historic function of fed-
eralism and separation of powers.
28. 392 U.S. at 127.
29. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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Court of Appeals for relief of the Supreme Court. It cannot wisely
be solved by perversion of fundamental constitutional principles.
A further major source of complexity arising from the dualistic
structure of American constitutions derives from the fact that direct and
indirect constitutional limitations do not necessarily have the same
thrust in terms of the extent of protection afforded the individual. In
consequence, under the modem practice of full-blown constitutional re-
view there are four possible outcomes in constitutional litigation.
Whether governmental action is that of the legislature, the executive,
or the judiciary, it may be constitutional by indirect limitation but un-
constitutional by direct; it may be constitutional by direct limitation
yet unconstitutional by indirect; it may be unconstitutional under both;
or it may be constitutional under both. The necessary corollary of
dualism is that challenged acts of government must twice run the con-
stitutional gauntlet before their judicial validation is complete. A re-
view of landmark decisions of the Court from Marshall's time to 1966
illustrates these patterns and discloses the easy possibilities for indis-
crimination.80
Of four decisions handed down by the United States Supreme
Court on May 27, 1975, two reveal among the Justices judicial mis-
management of dualism in their role as exclusive interpreter of the fed-
eral Constitution. It is harsh, yet justifiable, to observe that this now
bald claim to exclusivity in constitutional interpretation ought to be ac-
companied by a most thorough understanding of the instrument with
respect to which the claim is made.
Take first Fry v. United States,31 in which seven members of the
Court sustained, in application to an Ohio law effecting a 10.6 percent
increase in wages and salaries of all state employees, the Federal Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970.'2 Writing the opinion for the Court,
Mr. Justice Marshall had no difficulty reaching the conclusion of consti-
tutionality under the commerce clause. To him Wickard v. Filburn33
and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States84 were sufficient prec-
edent for a finding of effect on commerce among the states. Substan-
tial increases for 65,000 employees of the State of Ohio, along with
30. See Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-
Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. Rv. 111 (1967).
31. 421 U.S. 542 (1975)._
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970). The maximum allowed by the Pay Board under
the Act was seven percent.
33. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
34. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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the possibility of "similar numbers" from forty-nine other jurisdictions,
"could inject millions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy
and might exert pressure on other segments of the work force to de-
mand comparable increases."3 5  There was the federalistic problem
that major state functions were involved. But the Court held that "this
argument is foreclosed by our decision in Maryland v. Wirtz," relied
upon by the lower court, "where we held that the Fair Labor Standards
Act could constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by
a State."3 6 The Economic Stabilization Act is, we are told, less intru-
sive than the earlier FLSA extension, which, we are doubly assured,
"was quite limited in application." Yet despite the asserted modicum of
intrusion, "[i]t seems inescapable that the effectiveness of federal ac-
tion would have been drastically impaired if wage increases to this size-
able group of employees were left outside the reach of these emer-
gency federal wage controls." 7
A crumb is thrown to petitioners in a footnote, in response to their
reliance upon the tenth amendment as a limitation on the commerce
power. Despite reduction of that amendment to the status of a mere
truism in United States v. Darby,38 the Court now concedes that "it is
not without significance." 9 Note, however, the thrust of the recogni-
tion: "The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system."' 40  Here, however, it is the Court's judgment that "the wage
restriction regulations constituted no such drastic invasion of state sov-
ereignty." 41 The clear concern is for the state as a polity, not for a
division of governmental powers in the interest of indirect protection
for individual rights. An analog in the separation of powers context
would be concern for the judicial power per se, not concern for the in-
dependence of the judiciary as guarantor of the vitality of -judicial re-
view for the indirect shielding of individual rights.
From the commentator's viewpoint, it is disappointing that Mr.
Justice Douglas found it improper to reach the merits, because in his
view, termination of the congressional act shortly after grant of certio-
35. 421 U.S. at 547.
36. Id. at 548, citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
37. Id.
38. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
39. 421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 547-48 n.7.
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ranl called for dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted. Disap-
pointment springs from the fact not only that Justice Douglas had dis-
sented in Maryland v. Wirtz, 42 but that he had also refused to accede
to Court sustainment of congressional impingement upon traditional
state domain in New York v. United States," where he was joined by
Mr. Justice Black, and in United States v. Oregon,44 where the two Jus-
tices parted company.45 The thread running through these dissents4"
is that of concern for preservation of the fiscal interests of the states,
in the face of federal envelopment through the commerce, taxing, and
spending powers. The threat was least in Oregon, more apparent in
New York, and deadly serious in Maryland. United States v. Califor-
nia,47 relied upon by the Fry majority along with Maryland v. Wirtz,
was decided before Justice Douglas came to the Court. However, he
had no disagreement with that decision; no overwhelming danger to
state fiscal policy lay in federal statutory penalties imposed upon state-
owned railroads for violation of the federal Safety Appliance Act.48
42. 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. 326 U.S. 572, 590 (1946) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting) (federal excise
tax on mineral waters of Saratoga Springs, bottled and sold by a public corporation of
the State of New York).
44. 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (conflicting federal and state claims to personal property
of a veteran dying intestate and without heirs in a Veterans' Administration hospital).
45. In two decisions following hard on New York v. United States, Mr. Justice
Douglas had dissented technically on grounds of statutory interpretation. Involved was
the extension of maximum price regulations of World War II to sales of state-owned
tangible personalty. Dissenting from Court sustainment of such extension, he would
have avoided a construction that carried "substantial intrusions on the sovereignty of the
States." But citation of his dissent in New York following his observation that for him
there were presented "serious constitutional questions" is evidence that his concerns were
at the constitutional level. Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S. 103, 106 (1946);
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 103 (1946).
46. That Mr. Justice Douglas failed to dissent in Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), is not easy to reconcile, ct. Linde, Justice
Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4, 19-31 (1964). Its impli-
cations for federal intrusion upon state sovereignty seem serious. An explanation may
lie in the fact that the Justice's concern at the moment lay elsewhere. Oklahoma was
argued and decided together with United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947), wherein Mr. Justice Douglas was at vigorous odds with the majority
validation of the Hatch Act in its application to federal employees. Id. at 115, 120-
26 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Yet he did not join the Black-Rutledge dissent
based upon the constitutional proposition that political sterilization of all federal employ-
ees violated the first amendment. Rather he found basis for conflict resolution in a dis-
tinction between administrative employees and industrial employees, the latter of whom
should have the "constitutional freedom to pursue conventional political activities."
Linde, supra, at 34. The Justice makes no reference to Oklahoma in his dissent in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 201-05.
47. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
48. 45 U.S.C. § 6 (1970).
INDIRECT LIMITATIONS
But the application of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act49 to em-
ployees of state schools and hospitals, litigated in Maryland v. Wirtz,
was another matter. "If all this can be done then the National Govern-
ment could devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sov-
ereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment. . . . In this case the
State as a sovereign power is being seriously tampered with, potenti-
ally crippled."
50
Although the wage and salary levels set by federal administrative
action under the Economic Stabilization Act would, if enforced, have
foiled a major pay hike for nearly 65,000 employees of the State of
Ohio, it is not clear that Mr. Justice Douglas would have dissented in
Fry. There is not present the kind of threat to state fiscal policy that
lurked in the earlier cases. But a threat to state fiscal policy greater
than any in those cases is posed by the major extension of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, through amendment in 1974, to all state and local
employees not falling within two exceptions: non-civil service person-
nel and elective officers and their assistants in positions at policymaking
levels. 51 National League of Cities v. Dunlop, 2 in which this major
extension of federal domain beyond that encountered in Maryland v.
Wirtz is contested by a battery of state attorneys general, was argued
at the last term but was subsequently set down for reargument at the
current term.53 Had Mr. Justice Douglas been able to continue on the
Court, there is good reason to believe a judgment of invalidity on his
part would have resulted.
54
Two features are clear. One is that in Justice Douglas' mind
there was no inconsistency between his position in the cases dis-
cussed and his consistent support of the extension of congressional au-
thority, culminating in his writing the controlling opinion in Perez v.
United States,55 when private interests challenged federal legislation on
the ground that it violated the division of power between the nation
49. 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1970).
50. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissomting).
51. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 58, amending
29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e) (2) (Supp. 1975)).
52. 421 U.S. 907 (1975).
53. 421 U.S. 986 (1975). The clerks office advises that, at the earliest, reargu-
ment will take place in late February of 1976.
54. Mr. Justice Stewart, having joined in the Douglas dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz,
might be expected to find invalidity in the latest extension of the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act even though he did not dissent in Fry. Having dissented in Fry,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist would presumably be of like mind. But with Mr. Justice Douglas
gone, a judicial halt to federal jeopardizing of state fiscal integrity is an unlikely possi-
bility.
55. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (federal law forbidding extortionate credit transactions,
applied to a loan shark in a transaction taking place wholly within one state).
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and the states. The second point of clarity is that increasingly Justice
Douglas conceived the issue in the Fry type of case as one of inter-
governmental immunities rather than of the reach of federal taxing and
regulatory policy via the operation of the necessary and proper clause
upon a specifically granted federal power. In this conception it is the
rights of the state per se that are considered; there is no accommo-
dation for the original view of federalism as a device of indirect limita-
tion operating for the benefit of the individual.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist did dissent in Fry, believing that the case
under review possessed the same "dangers to our federal system" that
he, like Mr. Justice Douglas, found in Maryland v. Wirtz. "The Tenth
Amendment, the Court's opinion in this case insists, does have mean-
ing; but the critical question is how much meaning is left to it and the
basic constitutional principles which it illumines."56 Yet in line of
reasoning the Rehnquist analysis is remarkably like that of Justice
Douglas, whose Maryland dissent he cites. He finds the same funda-
mental distinction between invocation of the commerce clause by pri-
vate interests and by the state. "[Ain individual who attacks an Act
of Congress on the ground that it is not within congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause asserts only a claim of lack of legislative
power," an assertion "ordinarily very difficult to sustain. 51
But an individual who attacks an Act of Congress, justified under
the Commerce Clause, on the ground it infringes his rights under,
say, the First or Fifth Amendment, is asserting an affirmative con-
stitutional defense of his own, one which can limit the exercise of
power which is otherwise expressly delegated to Congress ...
In this case, as well as in Wirtz and United States v. Califor-
nia, the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional
legislative authority, but rather is asserting an affirmative constitu-
tional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such
congressionally asserted authority.5"
Absent is the traditional conception of federalism as dividing the
spheres of national and state authority to effectuate the limitation of
power that would thereby flow derivatively for the benefit of the indi-
vidual. It is now a matter of the states' defense of their own political
integrity. And, to demonstrate the difference, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
employs a contrast between the weakness of the individual's constitu-
tional claim under the commerce clause, a species of indirect limitation,
56. 421 U.S. at 550.
57. Id. at 552-53.
58. Id. at 553.
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and its strength under the affirmative first or fifth amendments, each
expressive of the direct form of delimitation. Indirect limitation as a
mechanism for restriction of the power of government is left a kind
of derelict on the backwaters of constitutional theory and practice.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Fry inevitably leads him to perceive
the relevancy of the Court decisions on intergovernmental immunities,
with two paragraphs then given to New York v. United States as a lead-
ing decision on intergovernmental tax immunity. Examining that case
brought the conclusion that "six members of the Court, as it was then
constituted, thought that the principles of federalism reflected in the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution did not stop with merely pro-
hibiting Congress from discriminating between States and other taxable
entities in the exercise of the taxing power."59  As was so with Mr.
Justice Douglas, the emphasis is on protection of the state, not the indi-
vidual, an emphasis Justice Rehnquist buttresses by resort to Hans v.
Louisiana ° "for the principle that the States as such were regarded by
the Framers of the Constitution as partaking of many attributes of sov-
ereignty quite apart from the provisions of the Tenth Amendment." 61
It is significant that the editors of two of the major constitutional law
casebooks, in their revised editions for 1975, are disposed to locate Fry
and its antecedents in their respective chapters on intergovernmental
immunities.6
Less than three weeks after Fry came down, a unanimous Court
reaffirmed the removal of one plank of the American constitutional
framework as erected by the Framers. In the considerable debate that
had arisen as to whether minimum fee schedules of local bar associa-
tions constituted a violation of the Sherman Act, attention was directed
largely to the continued viability of the supposed exemption for profes-
sional associations; the question of the constitutional reach of the Act
was either disregarded or given short shrift.63 Predictably, Goldfarb
59. Id. at 556.
60. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
61. 421 U.S. at 556.
62. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrUTIONAL_ LAW 125-26, 386-87 (9th ed. 1975); W. LocK-
HART, Y. KAmisAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 487-504 (4th ed. 1975).
63. Two commentators who do give attention to the question reach ridiculous
lengths in their assertions as to the scope of congressional power under the commerce
clause. Branca, Bar Association Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives: Reflections
on a Sherman Exemption That Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-AiAs. L. Pv. 207, 224-25
(1974) ("The practice of commercial law involves and affects such clients as corpora-
tions, manufacturers, retailers and distributors who do business and have contacts and
connections with many states.... Further, if legal activities were not involved in, and
did not affect, commerce in more than one state, there would not be problems in the
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v. Virginia State Bar64 quickly put the commerce issue out of conten-
tion. Technically, it brought within federal compass only minimum at-
torney fees for title examination. The primary constitutional prop was
the concept of stream of commerce, first formulated in Swift & Co. v.
United States,65 raised to full decisional level in Stafford v. Wallace,60
and occasionally invoked thereafter.67  Title examination being, in the
Court's view, commercially necessary in real estate transactions, it fol-
lowed that "a title examination is an integral part of an interstate trans-
action '6 where mortgage money flows across state lines. "The fact
that there was no showing that home buyers were discouraged by the
challenged activities does not mean that interstate commerce was not
affected. Otherwise, the magnitude of the effect would control, and
our cases have shown that, once an effect is shown, no specific magni-
tude need be proved."69 This statement contains a classic non sequi-
tur. It is quite correct that the Court's cases hold that once some effect
is demonstrated the magnitude is immaterial. 70  But here the Chief
Justice has just stated for the Court that there has been shown no effect
on interstate commerce. By the old arithmetic, anyway, multiplication
of any magnitude by zero still yields a product of zero.
The potential reach of Goldfarb far exceeds its technical holding.
Should the mortgage money come in some instances from intrastate
sources, the Court's response can be that title examination is nonethe-
less within federal policy control because such examinations are of a
class with those in which the flow of funds is interstate. Citation of
Perez v. United States7 1 will readily dispatch any constitutional conten-
tion on that score. The Goldfarb opinion assures that "[o]f course,
there may be legal services that involve interstate commerce in other
area of conflict of laws."); Comment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Prob.
lem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. Rav. 1236, 1245-47 ("'le use of the mails in giving
advice, billing clients, referring clients and subscribing to legal periodicals are activities
clearly in interstate commerce.").
64. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
65. 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905).
66. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
67. The concept was a thread in the reasoning of Mr. Justice Rutledge for the
Court in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948);
it was the basis of the Court's reasoning in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947). Both cases are cited in Goldfarb, as is Swift.
68. 421 U.S. at 784.
69. Id. at 785.
70. E.g., United States v. McKesson & Ribbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The
proposition dates from the early decisions on the reach of the Wagner and the Fair
Labor Standard Acts. On its facts, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178
(1946), is most striking.
71. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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fashions" than by becoming "an integral part of an interstate transac-
tion."7  The "channel of commerce" doctrine could be drawn upon
in instances where the factual pattern of legal practice discloses repeti-
tive use of interstate commerce.7 13 Also readily at hand, with many
a citation supporting its use, is the Keynesian-type economic reasoning
by which there is no private activity, no matter how "local," that does
not in some fashion affect interstate commerce.74 Even price fixing
by two bootblacks in Podunk could be put an end to were Congress
disposed to remove such a threat to the competitive ideal imbedded
in the Sherman Act. True, the last cited language from the Courts
opinion continues with the observation that "[t]here may be legal serv-
ices that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act,"75 but no one should be taken in by
this proffered reassurance. At the constitutional level, there is noth-
ing left of federalism as a mechanism for indirect constitutional limita-
tion of federal power in the interest of individual protections. The
states will be lucky if as polities they are themselves saved from com-
plete federal overrun of their fiscal independence. And if they are,
they will, rather paradoxically, owe major thanks to their staunch de-
fense by none other than Mr. Justice Douglas.
Goldfarb does not disturb the doctrine of Parker v. Brown,7 6
which establishes an exemption from the Sherman Act where state ac-
tion is found. At the same time, however, the decision of the High
Court does not augur well for the federalistic foundation on which rests
the Parker doctrine. The integrated Virginia State Bar, through which
the state supreme court regulates the practice of law in Virginia, had
condoned minimum fee schedules and implemented its position by is-
suance of ethical opinions providing that "any lawyer, whether or not
a member of his county bar association, may be disciplined for 'habitu-
ally charg[ing] less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by
his local Bar Association.' "' But to the Court the state bar's warning
72. 421 U.S. at 785.
73. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); North American
Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
74. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v.
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922). A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), in which the Court unanimously rejected the theory of
"buying power" interdependence between local activity and interstate commerce, has
been overruled sub silentio by Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
75. 421 U.S. at 785.
76. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
77. 421 U.S. at 782, quoting Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opin-
ion No. 170, May 28, 1971.
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that disciplinary action might result from habitual disregard of county
bar minimum fees signalled joinder in a "private anticompetitive activity"
rather than projection of affirmative state policy. "It is not enough that,
as the County Bar put it, anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state
action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction
of the State acting as a sovereign. 1 78  From this it is apparent that in
the antitrust context "state action" possesses none of the elasticity fa-
miliar in its constitutional setting.
Lower federal court decisions shortly antedating the Court's ruling
in Goldfarb disclose that Parker was being read restrictively. In the
companion case to Goldfarb, United States v. Oregon State Bar, 0 ini-
tiated by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, Oregon statute
law made the Oregon State Bar a public corporation, and an instrumen-
tality of the judicial department of the state government. Nevertheless,
in the view of the federal district court even this close relationship was
insufficient to give the bar antitrust immunity on its motion for sum-
mary disposition.
There is no Oregon statute specifically authorizing the prom-
ulgation of an attorneys' fees schedule; nor, of course, is there a
federal statute explicitly recognizing or implicitly authorizing the
formulation of such fee schedules. In addition, the fee schedules
published and distributed by the defendant were neither debated in
public hearings nor approved by a disinterested state commission. In
short, there is not the substantial state direction and involvement
required to meet the legislative mandate requirements and to ele-
vate these Oregon State Bar activities to the plateau of "state ac-
tion" immunity.8
0
The Oregon State Bar opinion relied largely on two courts of ap-
peals decisions, one from the First Circuit,81 the other from the Ninth.82
The former disposed on summary judgment of a private action by one
manufacturer of "pipeless" swimming pools against another, alleging
violations of the Sherman" and Clayton Acts.8 4  The type of pool in-
volved was one purchased for the most part by public bodies through
78. Id. at 791.
79. 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
80. Id. at 511.
81. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir. 1970).
82. New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
83. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1970)).
84. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 29 U.S.C.).
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competitive bidding. Alleged antitrust violations lay in attempts to in-
fluence architects and engineers retained by the public bodies for de-
sign and construction. Defendant conceded all allegations, but claimed
antitrust exemption under Parker and a related doctrine. In a reversal
of the trial court, summary judgment was denied the defendant.
Our reading of Parker convinces us that valid government action
confers antitrust immunity only when government determines that
competition is not the summum bonum in a particular field and de-
liberately attempts to provide an alternate form of public regula-
tion.
In terms of such deliberate governmental occupation of a field
normally left to the free winds of competition, this case falls at the
opposite end of the spectrum from Parker.85
The decision in the Ninth Circuit came in a suit by the State of
New Mexico asserting antitrust violations by six suppliers of asphalt.
Defendants counterclaimed, alleging a conspiracy on the part of the
state and some of its subdivisions as consumers of asphalt, to fix prices
and eliminate competition. Affirming dismissal of the counterclaim,
the court of appeals rejected defendants' claim that the state-is immune
only in the circumstances specified in the passage just quoted from the
First Circuit's opinion:
Since the suit here is directly against the state, there can be no
such question [as to the source of the conduct], and the [First Cir-
cuit's] analysis is inapplicable. The "legislative mandate?' test is
useful, indeed possibly necessary, when there is doubt if the de-
fendant or the regulatory scheme is really an instrument of the
state. But when there is no doubt that the defendant is the state,
the "legislative mandate" analysis is unnecessary.8 6
Antitrust immunity can thus be had where the state is affirma-
tively implicated. But that this condition is hard to come by is further
evidenced by the last pre-Goldfarb lower court decisions. The United
85. 424 F.2d at 30.
86. 501 F.2d at 370 (footnote omitted). While Whitten was distinguished, the
reasoning of H{echt v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972), was disapproved. Hecht and others had brought a Sherman Act
suit alleging violation in a restrictive covenant of a lease executed by the District of
Columbia Armory Board in favor of the Washington Redskins. The covenant forbade
use of the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium by any other professional football team. Defend-
ant had successfully contended that the Armory Board was an instrumentality of the
District of Columbia, making its action governmental in character. Reversing, the ap-
pellate court disagreed with the "facile conclusion" that governmental participation re-
solves the issue of Sherman Act applicability. Id. at 935. With the implication that
states are always immune from antitrust liability, the Ninth Circuit in turn disagreed.
"We can do no more than say that.., we disagree with the implication of Hecht that
a state may sometimes be liable." 501 F.2d at 371.
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States was successful in an antitrust proceeding against the National So-
ciety of Professional Engineers,8s whose code of ethics, as promulgated
by its board of directors in 1964, decreed that a member "shall not
solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis of competitive bid-
ding.18  Defense predicated upon the Parker doctrine was of no avail.
The instant Complaint charges defendant with illegal restraint
of trade on a nationwide basis. It does not attack the action of
any state official or agency. Unlike the situation in Parker, the
challenged activity of NSPE and its members was a private con-
spiracy in restraint of trade and not conducted pursuant to the com-
mand of any state legislature. There is no evidence of any state
enforcement machinery, present in Parker, which suggests that
when the 16 states decided to prohibit competitive bidding they
also intended to establish an alternate form of public regulatory
control. Defendant's activities are plainly interstate in nature, un-
encumbered by the regulations of individual states. The explora-
tion of Parker urged by defendant is both [sic] unfounded in logic
as well as in law. The doctrine of state immunity enunciated by
the Court in Parker simply has no applicability to a code of ethics
which has been formulated outside the command and supervision
of a state agency.89
Yet, only a few weeks later, architects won immunity under
Parker in Bank Building & Equipment Corp. v. National Council of Ar-
chitectural Registration Boards,90 a decision of the same federal court.
Unavailability of the opinion at time of writing forces reliance upon an
unofficial capsulation.
The decision to dismiss Sherman Act charges centered upon
the court's conclusions that the architectural boards of West Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas "are
each regulatory agencies of their respective states exercising the po-
lice power of their respective states in licensing persons to practice
the profession of architecture. . ." and the Sherman Act does not
apply to action by a state . . . pursuant to its police power exer-
cised through a regulatory agency of the State.9 1
Subsequently, on the other hand, a trial court of Ohio, one of the six
states referred to in Bank Building, reached the opposite conclusion;
against the Architects Society of Ohio a consent judgment was entered
87. United States v. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193
(D.D.C. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975).
88. Id. at 1195 n.1.
89. Id. at 1201.
90. Civil Act. No. 74-896 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1975), excerpted in 701 BNA ArNi-




expressly forbidding fee schedules and enjoining the Society from limit-
ing an architect's independent determination of his fees. 2 In current
litigation are challenges to price fixing by anesthesiologists,93 physi-
cians, 94 and public utilities.9 5  Inasmuch as the rates charged by the
public utility in the last-named suit were set independently by the pub-
lic service commissions of two states, state action would appear clear,
but the other two cases again present the question of when the licens-
ing of professional groups implicates the state sufficiently to bring such
groups under the Parker umbrella.
To the resulting uncertainty concerning the present scope of the
Parker doctrine has been added the recent action of the Supreme Court
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United Slates,98 vacat-
ing the judgment and remanding "for further consideration in the light
of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. '97 This action is puzzling on its face
because of the seeming consistency between the district court's reason-
ing in Professional Engineers and that of the Supreme Court itself in
Goldfarb. Explanation may lie in a Goldfarb footnote, wherein the
Court perceived for antitrust relevancy a distinction between a business
and a profession. "It would be unrealistic to view the practice of pro-
fessions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automati-
cally to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas."98  This observation is suggestive that while the Court re-
jects full exemption of learned professions from the Sherman Act, asso-
ciations with a "public service aspect" are not subject to the rule for
business associations, that price fixing is per se illegal, but only to a
rule of reason. The district court in Professional Engineers had de-
clared it "undisputed that price fixing is a per se unreasonable restraint
of trade under the Sherman Act,"9' 9 rendering irrelevant the reason-
ableness of the ethical proscription against competitive bidding for en-
92. Ohio v. Architects Soc'y, 75 CV 04-1693 (Franklin County C.P., Apr. 25,
1975), excerpted in 712 BNA ANrmusr & TRADE REG. REP. A-27.
93. United States v. American Soe'y of Anesthesiologists, No. 75-4640 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Sept. 22, 1975), excerpted in 732 BNA ANTrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-16 to
-17.
94. Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., No. C-2-75-473 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 9, 1975),
excerpted in 724 BNA Arrrrrusr & TRADE REG. REP. A-8 to -9.
95. City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., Civil Act. No. S 74-72 (N.D.
Ind., juris. noted May 1, 1975), excerpted in 714 BNA AN-rrhusT & TRADE REG. REP.
A-7.
96. 422 U.S. 1031 (1975).
97. Id.
98. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
99. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1199
(D.D.C. 1974).
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gineering services. Accordingly, that court did not consider testimony
amassed in the record by counsel for NSPE---evidence quite convincing
that, when the nature of the functions of architect and professional en-
gineer is understood, a requirement of competitive bidding in that con-
text would be a distinct disservice to the public interest.100 Inasmuch
as such evidence would have to be considered in the judicial application
of a rule of reason, the Supreme Court's vacation and remand is ex-
plainable on this hypothesis.
Among professional associations, there may well be gradations in
the degree to which price fixing can be reconciled with true public in-
terest. Professor Paul Verkuil puts the matter well:
A capricious use of the antitrust laws by federal agencies or the ju-
diciary bears grave implications, making some recognition of Park-
er's applicability indispensable to orderly federal-state relations.
Yet recognition must also be accorded the values the antitrust laws
seek to foster. When the challenged regulation is predicated upon
dubious economic principles, a major bulwark of the Parker doc-
trine is absent and its applicability is thereby rendered suspect.
The need to reconcile competing considerations in such cases ar-
gues for an individual inquiry, focusing upon the state's total com-
mitment to the regulation, to determine whether Parker should act
in an exemptive capacity.' 0'
By way of illustration, it is distinctly possible to make a stronger
case for elimination of competitive bidding among architects and pro-
fessional engineers than can be made for the retention of minimum fee
schedules for practicing lawyers. For the latter type of competitive re-
straint, the Supreme Court in Goldfarb showed little tolerance. "On
this record respondents' activities constitute a classic illustration of price
fixing,' 02 for which in the Court's mind there exists no justifying con-
siderations in the mode by which legal services are delivered. With
architects and professional engineers, on the contrary, there is in con-
gressional legislation a source of justification for their anticompetitive
stance. A 1972 amendment to the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act codifies long-standing practice in employing negotia-
tion procedures rather than competitive bidding as established policy
in procurement of architectural and engineering services for federal
projects.lo
3
100. Brief for Defendant on remand, at 7-9, 15-20, National Soe'y of Professional
Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-72 (filed Oct. 15, 1975).
101. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975).
102. 421 U.S. at 783.
103. 40 U.S.C. §§ 541-44 (Supp. 1972). Note especially section 542.
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This distinction in judgment between professions does not alone pro-
vide the predicate for a differing result under a rule-of-reason ap-
proach. The existence of the Congressional Act, unnoted by the dis-
trict court in its opinion in Professional Engineers, suggests an inde-
pendent basis for explanation of the vacation and remand in that case.
Alternatively, the Court, in remanding Professional Engineers, may
have felt a judicial determination necessary to decide whether the con-
gressional enactment put that situation on all fours with Parker, where
California and congressional policy were in unison in substituting for
free market forces governmental programs of production control.10 4
Immunity ought to be present at least where federal-state policies are
in tandem. Commentators' views can and do understandably vary.
Thus Professor Phillip Areeda would allow state regulatory programs
to be overturned by antitrust law absent affirmative federal policy fa-
voring them, as was the fact in Parker itself. 105 On the other hand,
Professor Paul Verkuil, persuaded that "important arguments can be
made for the [Parker] doctrine's viability,' 06 would require that Con-
gress specifically legislate beyond the Sherman Act before state regula-
tory programs can be subordinated. 0 7  Professors Posner and Slater
take intermediate positions that call for the weighing of competing con-
siderations in various patterns of clash between adherence to and de-
parture from antitrust policy.'0 8 Whatever the judgment at this point,
since Parker is a product of statutory interpretation there remains the
threat of complete annihilation of federalistic values through extension
of congressional power on the constitutional level. Wirtz and Fry are
already on the books, with the impending likelihood, in Dunlop, of vali-
dation of further projection of federal supremacy. Nor will there likely
be any more protection for state regulatory policy than for state fiscal
independence, should Congress see fit further to move in on state pol-
ity.
In striking contrast to the Court's deflation of federalism as an in-
direct limitation, illustrated by Fry, is its distention of separation of
powers in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,109 decided the
104. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943).
105. P. AREEDA, ANrmusr ANALYsIs 57-58 (1967).
106. Verkuil, supra note 101, at 343.
107. Id.
108. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L REv. 71 (1974).
109. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
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same day. USSF had sought to enjoin the implementation of a
subpoena.duces tecum issued on behalf of the Senate Subcommittee
on Internal Security to a bank in possession of the records of the organ-
ization. As chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Eastland had
signed the subpoena. Named as defendants, along with the chairman,
were eight other senators of the subcommittee, the committee's chief
counsel, and the bank. USSF's claim was that the records in question
were the equivalent of confidential membership lists, that the conse-
quence of disclosure would be the loss of much of the organization's
financial support through fewer contributions from private individuals,
and that the "sole purpose" of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, pun-
ish and deter" USSF and its members in the exercise of their first
amendment rights.110
A divided court of appeals reversed the district court dismissal," 1
finding the constitutional claim at one with that sustained in NAACP
v. Alabama"2 and Bates v. Little Rock."13  Even the dissenting judge
saw the pertinency of the first amendment claim, but, employing as
guidelines Watkins v. United States"z4 and Barenblatt v. United
States,"15 struck the balance in favor of the investigative role of Con-
gress." 8 Again came reversal: "We conclude that the actions of the
Senate Subcommittee, the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel
are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art.
I, § 6, cl. 1, and are therefore immune from judicial interference. We
reverse.' '117
The opinion of the Court, by the Chief Justice, early identifies
the speech or debate clause as a specific articulation of the concept of
separation of powers; "our cases make it clear that the 'central role'
of the Clause is to 'prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive
and accountability before a hostile judiciary .... , ",."s Having estab-
lished this constitutional proposition, the opinion proceeds to determine
the reach of the clause, concluding from earlier decisions and further
110. Id. at 495.
111. 488 F.2d 1252, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
112. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
113. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
114. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
115. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
116. 488 F.2d at 1280-82 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
117. 421 U.S. at 501.
118. Id. at 502, quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972). The
bill of attainder clauses are another specialized facet of separation of powers, as Chief
Justice Warren asserted in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966),
and in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
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examination that it is absolute in nature. There need be no quarrel
with a broad construction of the speech or debate clause, but that deter-
mination resolves only the constitutional issue of indirect limitation.
Remaining is the issue that USSF raised in its pleadings and which all
members of the court of appeals faced: whether the subpoena can be
squared with the direct limitation of the first amendment. This the Court
completely fails to appreciate. "That approach, however, ignores the
absolute nature of the speech or debate protection . . . ."I" The
Court's reasoning is utterly at variance with the dualism imbedded in
the American Constitution, and the year is 1975!
The decision was not unanimous; there was a concurrence and a
dissent. Mr. Justice Marshall, Justices Brennan and Stewart in accord,
concurred with the majority view so far as the separation of powers
aspect was concerned, and joined in the judgment because in the pos-
ture of this case he could see no way by which the first amendment
issue could be raised in the face of the "immunity" of the defendants.
Yet he cautioned that
I do not read the Court to suggest, however, nor could I agree,
that the constitutionality of a congressional subpoena is always
shielded from more searching judicial inquiry. For, as the very
cases on which the Court relies demonstrate, the protection of the
Speech and [sic] Debate Clause is personal. It extends to Members
and their counsel acting in a legislative capacity; it does not pre-
clude judicial review of their decisions in an appropriate case,
whether they take the form of legislation or a subpoena.
120
Subsequent paragraphs of the Marshall concurrence make it clear that
he had in mind the direct limitations of the Bill of Rights, particularly
"the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political
belief." 21 The difficulty was that
This case does not present the questions of what would be the
proper procedure, and who might be the proper parties defendant,
in an effort to get before a court a constitutional challenge to a sub-
poena duces tecum issued to a third party. As respondent's coun-
sel conceded at oral argument, this case is at an end if -the Senate
petitioners are upheld in their claim of immunity, as they must
be.' 22
At least the concurrers sensed the fundamental weakness in the
reasoning of the majority, and yet, by confounding procedure and sub-
stance they too failed to grasp the implications of American constitu-
119. 421 U.S. at 509.
120. Id. at 515.
121. Id. at 516, quoting Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
122. 421 U.S. at 517-18 (footnotes omitted).
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tional dualism. The absolute nature of the speech or debate clause
buttresses only legislative freedom of deliberation and investigation
from executive and judicial intrusion as a matter of the separation of
three supposedly coordinate branches of government. To construe the
clause as immunizing Congress procedurally from constitutional review
under direct limitations is fallacious. Analogous would be a determi-
nation that a congressional act that is federalistically constitutional fore-
closes consideration of its validity under the Bill of Rights, the due
process clause, or any other constitutional provision of the direct
type.
123
The lone dissenter in USSF was Mr. Justice Douglas. His opinion
consists of one paragraph, opening with the statement that "[t]he basic
issues in this case were canvassed by me in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 . . .(dissenting opinion), and by the Court in Dombrowski
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82. . .in an opinion which I joined.' 24 The
first of these cited cases was an action for damages under federal civil
rights legislation for alleged denial of constitutional rights.'2  In a con-
test for the office of mayor of San Francisco, plaintiff Brandhove had
supported a candidate whom his opponent had charged was a Commu-
nist. For his efforts to challenge this smear, Brandhove was sum-
moned before a committee of the California legislature, officially enti-
tled the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities.
He refused to testify, was prosecuted for contempt, but won release
when the jury failed to return a verdict. In his action against members
of the committee, Brandhove claimed that the hearing was not for a
legislative purpose, but was to silence and deter him contrary to his
rights of free speech, due process, equal protection, and to his privi-
leges and immunities.1
26
Brandhove lost in the Supreme Court because that tribunal con-
cluded that the defendants were acting within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity-activity that the Court could not believe Congress
intended to include under civil rights legislation protective of constitu-
tional guarantees, in view of the long struggle in England and the
United States to achieve recognition of speech or debate immunity for
123. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), provides an excellent illustration of
Court realization that the challenged congressional act must be tested against both article
I, section 8 and fifth amendment due process.
124. 421 U.S. at 518.
125. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The provisions upon which reli-
ance was placed are now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970).
126. 341 U.S. at 371.
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legislators.12 7 Although Justice Douglas agreed with "the opinion of
the Court as a statement of general principles governing liability of
legislative committees and members of the legislatures,"1 2 he could
not agree on their complete freedom from external control.
We are dealing here with a right protected by the Constitu-
tion-the right of -free speech. The charge seems strained and dif-
ficult to sustain; but it is that a legislative committee brought the
weight of its authority down on respondent for exercising his right
of free speech. Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as
a prior restraint. If a committee departs so far from its domain to
deprive a citizen of a right protected by the Constitution, I can
think of no reason why it should be immune.129
Dombrowski v. Eastland'3 ° was a per curiam opinion responsive
to a suit for damages by Dombrowski and others against the chairman
and counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate. Plaintiffs' claim was that a
conspiracy between the defendants and certain Louisiana state officials
had resulted in violation of their fourth amendment rights. The claim
was quickly dispatched. As for the complaint against Senator Eastland,
it "must be dismissed" on the basis of "the doctrine of legislative im-
munity [which has its roots] . . . in the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution."'' Because the doctrine, although applicable to of-
ficers or employees of legislative bodies, was said to be less absolute
as to them, remand was directed with respect to the disposition of the
case against the committee counsel.
32
Citation of these two cases by Justice Douglas in USSF seems
odd; they do not well ventilate the basic issues, if those issues concern
the relevancy of direct limitation for speech or debate adjudication.
He did not even dissent in Dombrowski, and while he did in Tenney,
the posture of the litigation presented only tangentially the pertinence
of direct constitutional limitation in cases of defendant reliance on
speech or debate immunity. One wonders why the Justice did not in-
voke the line of decisions beginning with Kilbourn v. Thompson 3" that
constitutes the backbone of speech or debate clause doctrine.
Kilbourn itself can be passed over quickly for present purposes.
Although in jailing Kilbourn for his refusal to testify the House was
127. Id. at 379.
128. Id. at 381.
129. Id. at 382.
130. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
131. Id. at 84-85.
132. Id. at 85.
133. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
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found to have acted in excess of its powers, the members of the House
committee were held protected by the speech or debate clause; only
against the sergeant-at-arms was any redress sanctioned, and that by
way of judgment against him in Kilbourn's action for false imprison-
ment.1 4 The year was 1881; any succor by way of direct limitations
in this context remained for the future. By the time United States v.
Johnson'15 was in litigation, direct limitations providing protection for
civil liberties were in full bloom. However, a criminal action against
a former congressman for violation of the federal conflict-of-interest
statute, and for conspiracy to defraud the United States, hardly offered
an appropriate occasion for contemplation of such constitutional limita-
tions as a restriction on congressional authority under the speech or de-
bate clause. Mr. Justice Douglas joined in a dissent of three, but on
a point not relevant to "the basic issues" of USSF.1'3
New developments came with the 1970's. United States v. Brew-
ster'37 presented the question of the constitutionality of the federal an-
tibribery law as applied to a former United States senator. The issue
was the scope of the speech or debate clause. The majority held the
statute constitutional. 38 Again, Justice Douglas joined in a three-way
dissent that found the clause of such breadth as to render the statute
invalid. In the dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan,
there is, however, a beginning recognition of a direct form of limitation
on legislative independence as regards a chamber's own members. "It
is doubtful, for example, that the Congress could punish a Member for
the mere expression of unpopular views otherwise protected by the
First Amendment."'31 9
Decided contemporaneously with Brewster was Gravel v. United
134. Id. at 205.
135. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
136. Id. at 186-87.
137. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
138. Id. at 528-29.
139. Id. at 544, citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). The quoted sentence
is immediately followed by one asserting that the two Houses of Congress in disciplining
the conduct of members are not free from "restraints imposed by or found in the impli-
cations of the Constitution," citing Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S.
579, 614 (1929), quoted in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 nA0 (1969). It
is not clear to what constitutional restraints the Barry Court had reference, but certainly
not to article I, section 5 which was there treated as nonjusticiable. A footnote in
Powell is an unpersuasive effort to distinguish Barry. See 395 U.S. at 519 n.40. The
Powell reversal on justiciability forced the Court to face the bearing of the speech or
debate clause on the situation then before it. But the factual pattern in Powell did not
necessitate judicial consideration of the pertinency of direct limitations. For this reason
the Powell decision, important as it is in other contexts, does not require further atten-
tion in the present analysis.
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States.'40 Senator Gravel had first leaked the existence of the Penta-
gon Papers by reading a summary of them to his subcommittee on Pub-
lic Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee; he
had then introduced the Papers in their entirety into the public record,
and allegedly had subsequently made arrangements with the Beacon
Press for publication of the Papers. 4' The issue in Gravel was
whether information-gathering is within the scope of speech or debate
clause immunity for members of the Congress and their aides. The
majority of the Court refused to read the clause to cover the Senator's
actions with respect to the Papers, although it did conclude that aides
are immunized to the same extent as members. 42  Mr. Justice Doug-
las' dissent discloses the increasing interrelation in his mind between
direct and indirect limitation, although the two have not yet come into
full correlation as dual principles of constitutional limitation of govern-
mental power.
I would construe the Speech or Debate Clause to insulate Sen-
ator Gravel and his aides from inquiry concerning the Pentagon Pa-
pers, and Beacon Press from inquiry concerning publication of
them, for that publication was but another way of informing the
public as to what had gone on in the privacy of the Executive
Branch concerning the conception and pursuit of the so-called
"war" in Vietnam. Alternatively, I would hold that Beacon Press
is protected by the First Amendment from prosecution or investiga-
tions for publishing or undertaking to publish the Pentagon Pa-
pers.
43
From direct and indirect limitations as alternative bases in consti-
tutional interpretation, Justice Douglas moves in Doe v. McMillan"'
to a realization of their dualistic character. The fact pattern is much
like that of USSF; there is a threat to the confidentiality of disciplinary
data on named students in the printing and distribution of a House re-
port, resulting from a select subcommittee study of District of Columbia
schools. The complaint takes the form of a class action brought by par-
ents for themselves and their children for compensatory and injunctive
relief; the defense is the immunity given by the speech or debate
clause.145 The Court majority rejected plaintiffs' assertion that inclu-
sion in the report of specific conduct on the part of identified children
"was actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any legislative
140. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
141. Id. at 609-10.
142. Id. at 622.
143. Id. at 633.
144. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
145. Id. at 309-10.
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purpose."' 146 On the other hand, the protective mantle of the clause
did not extend to public distribution of the material despite assertions
of the dissenters that such coverage was essential to the informing func-
tion of Congress. 4 7
Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Mr. Justice Douglas was
in agreement with the dissenting view concerning the scope of the
speech or debate clause, yet he concurred because "[v]iolations of the
commands of the First Amendment are not within the scope of a legiti-
mate legislative purpose."'48  Thus attesting that governmental action
must pass muster under both indirect and direct limitations, the Jus-
tice goes on to observe that:
Unless we are to put blinders on our Congressmen and isolate them
from their constituents, the informing function must be entitled to
the same protection of the Speech or Debate Clause as those activi-
ties which relate directly and necessarily to the immediate function
of legislating. . . In my view the question to which we should
direct our attention is whether the House Report infringes upon the
constitutional rights of petitioners and therefore is subject to scru-
tiny by the federal courts..
49
The Douglas concurrence in Doe, crowning as it did his growing
appreciation of the dualism in the American constitutional framework,
would seem to have been the precedential statement he would have
cited as identifying the "basic issues" in Eastland v. United States Serv-
icemen's Fund. But whatever the explanation for his turning to Ten-
ney and Dombrowski for a point of departure,5 0 the Justice was on
the right track in dissenting. As he put it:
Under our federal regime that delegates, by the Constitution
and Acts of Congress, awesome powers to individuals [in positions
of official authority], that power may not be used to deprive peo-
ple of their First Amendment or other constitutional rights....
[No regime of law that can rightfully claim that name may make
trustees of these vast powers immune from actions brought by peo-
ple who have been wronged by official action.'"
146. Id. at 312.
147. Id. at 317.
148. Id. at 328 (emphasis in original). Note is to be taken as well of the Justice's
earlier assertion: "Acts done in violation of the Fourth Amendment-like assaults with
fists or clubs or guns-are outside the protective ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause;
certainly violations of the Fourth Amendment are not within the scope of a legitimate
legislative purpose," id. at 327 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 328.
150. See text following note 132 supra.
151. 421 U.S. at 518. From the context it is clear that the "individuals" to whom
Justice Douglas refers are those holding public office.
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